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T h e past decade's huge growth in local government expenditures, the near bankruptcy of major American cities, and the rising swell of taxpayer discontent are leading indicators of a continuing urban fiscal crisis. A belief of many local government officials, citizens, and scholars is that collective bargaining is partly, and perhaps substantially, t o blame for this fiscal crisis.' The specific impacts of local government employee unionization and collective bargaining have been debated for the past decade. This debate has yielded occasionally conflicting and, on some issues, only fragmentary empirical evidence. This paper reviews available evidence as a means of developing generalizations about the impact of unionization and collective bargaining on local services and of identifying future research needs.
Wages and hours worked are probably the inputs most directly affected by collective bargaining. Impacts upon these inputs are translated, through other policy and strategy decisions, into decisions on the size and composition of the work force.
This review focuses primarily on three principal impacts of public employee unions and collective bargaining. First, the influence exerted on the inputs used t o produce local government services, especially employee wages, is assessed. Has unionization and collective bargaining led t o public employee wage and benefit gains? The second issue that is explored involves the productivity of resource utilization. For example, has collective bargaining led t o rtductions in labor productivity or adjustments in the productivity of other resources? The third impact involves the effects of unionization and collective bargaining on local government expenditure levels. Have local budgets risen with increasing input costs or have local governments held budgets down by compensating, on other ways, for cost This is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual conference of the American Society for Public Administration, Baltimore, Maryland, April 1979. The research has been supported by a grant from the Faculty Research Committee, University of California, Irvine. The authors would like to thank Naomi Caiden and Ann McWatters for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
While the growth of public employee unions and collective bargaining has stimulated research about their effects on local governments, the precise impacts remain shrouded in myths and polemics. In this review, empirical research about the effects of collective bargaining on local services is examined. A taxonomy is developed to compare and evaluate the research, the preponderance of which has focused on employee wages. Analysis of the research indicates that public employee gains from collective bargaining are not evenly distributed across occupational groups and that collective bargaining has contributed to increased municipal expenditures and fiscal effort. However, research still needs to be undertaken to fill significant gaps in our knowledge about collective bargaining's impacts, particularly with regard to the issues of the efficiency and effectiveness of local government services.
increases attributable t o collective bargaining? These and other issues are explored following a brief discussion of the analytic framework used for selecting and organizing the research literature.
The Analytic Framework
The framework we employ t o organize the relevant literature and, thereby, t o identify the impacts of unionization and collective bargaining on local government services is a modification of taxonomies developed by Bradford, Malt and Oates and by Burkhead and Hennigan.' The taxonomy is presented in Figure 1 .
Environmental variables influence each component of the system, but they are most crucial in stimulating the need for a particular service. The environment subsumes the economic conditions of supply and demand that influence inputs and outputs and the political and legal conditions that influence service delivery. Environmental factors might exacerbate or moderate the outgrowth of unionization and collective bargaining.
The input category in Figure 1 represents the various factors used in producing a particular service, including David ~e t h d received his MPA from Syracuse University and is currently a research assistant and doctoral candidate in the Graduate School of Administration, University of California, Irvine. He is specializing in public financial management. James Perry is associate professor in the Graduate School of Administration, University of California, Irvine. He is ceauthor or author of numerous articles and ceauthor of Technological Innovation in American Local Governments (Pergamon, 1979) . both the amount (e.g., number of employees and/or Review of the Literature hours-worked) and composition (e.g., number of fulltime workers versus number of part-time workers) of Summary information on 20 studies that investigated human resources. Public employee unions or collective the impacts of unionization and collective bargaining bargaining might affect managerial decisions about the upon aspects of the delivery of local government services amount and composition of these resources. Wages and is presented in Table 1 . We have selected research on hours worked are probably the inputs most directly municipal governments that empllyed large samples from affected by collective bargaining. Impacts upon these which statistical inferences were drawn.' Most of the inputs are translated, through other policy and strategy studies used an ex post facto research design and decisions, into decisions on the size and composition of multiple regression analysis. The studies we selected the work force.
originate predominately from the field of labor ecoThe activities category in Figure 1 refers t o the rules nomics, but some come from the fields of public regarding the quality and quantity of services delivered administration and organizational behavior. and the procedures for delivering a designated level of Several conventions were followed in creating Table  service . Since these rules influence the productivity of 1. First, the studies are listed chronologically t o highemployees and the efficiency of task accomplishment, light the development of this growing area of research. and because unions and collective bargaining often Second, abbreviated names of variables, rather than the influence these rules, it is expected that the productivity complete variable label, are sometimes used in the table. of the worker will be affected. The direction of the The independent variables reported in the table are effect on productivity, either an increase o r decrease, confined primarily t o those that measured variations in will depend upon the type of rule change.
either unionization or collective bargair~ing.~ Finally, the The output category of the taxonolny presented in "major findings" column in Table 1 summarizes only the Figure 1 refers t o the tasks accomplished or resources general conclusions of each of the studies. expended by the organization. Since outputs are a result Even without a detailed examination of each of the of some combination of inputs and activities, the effects studies in Table 1 , several generalizations evolve from of collective bargaining at other points in the input-outinspection of the summary information. For example, put chain might lead t o decreases or increases of output.
perusing the column in Table 1 headed "government The consequences category is not a simple derivative function studied" reveals that a great deal of research of the output component. Consequences of local services has focused on the uniformed services, i.e., police, fire, involve how citizens perceive matters of concern t o and transit. In fact, these functions are examined in a them. Despite improvements in how efficiently outputs majority of the studies. Research that looks exclusively are produced, environmental factors might hinder a at other local government functions is an exception. For proportionate improvement in the consequences of local example, little or n o research focuses on recreation, services. To the extent that collective bargaining affects library or social services. Of course, there are good outputs directly or how outputs are perceived by reasons for the predominant emphasis on uniformed citizens, the consequences of local services might be services, among them the essential nature of these altered.
services, their comparability from city t o city, and the This input-output taxonomy is used in the next availability of adequate data about these services. section t o classify the impacts of unionization and A review of coincides obviously with the period during which collective bargaining became an important dimension of public management. This period has been characterized as an era of substantial progress for public employee organizations, in terms of both membership growth and bargaining effectiveness Therefore, any conclusions derived from these studies must recognize the possible confounding influences of this historical period.
A final generalization worth noting concerns the dependent variables most frequently analyzed in this research. Wages, i.e., inputs t o local services, have received by far a greater amount of attention from scholars than any other variable. This imbalance of emphasis can probably be attributed t o the tradition of relative wage research in economics6 and t o the greater ease of conducting research on wages than on output variables. However, as the chronological progression in the dependent-variable column of Table 1 illustrates, research is increasingly being focused on variables within the output and consequence categories of the taxonomy in Figure 1 .
Inputs
Wages. As we noted earlier, the question researchers have most frequently asked about the impact of public sector unionization and collective bargaining concerns employee wage gains. Have municipal employees improved their wages through collective bargaining and, if they have, by how much? The answer t o this question seems to be yes-depending upon the occupational group involved-but wage levels overall have risen only marginally because of collective bargaining. Unionized fire fighters have reaped the greatest benefits, with estimates of their hourly wage increases ranging from 2 percent t o 28 percent.' However, the magnitude of these hourly wage increases is partly attributable t o decreases in average duty hours, since annual salaries of fire fighters have been estimated t o have increased n o more than 12 percent due t o collective bargaining8
Scholars have consistently concluded that unionized public employees do no better than unionized private employees. Thus, the observed differences between unionized and nonunionized employees reflect nothing endemic to the public sector, contrary to assertions that have received wide currency.
Other municipal employees have not fared as well as fire fighters, but transit employees are probably a close second with an estimated 9-12 percent wage differential between unionized and non-unionized organizations.' The wages of unionized police employees have actually been found t o lag behind their non-unionized counterparts in two studies, although two more recent analyses found that police unionization had a positive influence on wages1 These contrasting results probably indicate that employees in low-wage police departments or-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW ganized principally t o increase wages, but that their efforts did not achieve instantaneous success.l While the research results are not in complete accord, general municipal employees (e.g., highways, sewerage, sanitation, parks and recreation, and libraries) d o not appear t o have achieved significant wage gains from unionization. Only Ehrenberg and Goldstein concluded that unionization has had an upward influence on the wages of general municipal employees." Two studies, using more recent samples, found that unionization had n o effect on the wages of general municipal employees. ' Although the aggregate effects of collective bargaining on local employee wages would appear t o be positive, nothing sets the results for public employees apart from their private union counterparts. Scholars have consistently concluded that unionized public employees do no better than unionized private employees.14 Thus, the observed differences between unionized and nonunionized employees reflect nothing endemic t o the public sector, contrary t o assertions that have received wide currency. ' Fringe Benefits. The price of labor might not be the only input that has been affected by unionization and collective bargaining. Although research on employee benefits has been quite limited, there is some indication that employees, by organizing and bargaining collectively, are more likely t o improve their benefits and working conditions than they are wages. Four studies that have looked directly a t fringe benefits concluded that employees achieved fringe benefit gains through either unionization or collective bargaining.l Kochan and Wheeler's finding that collective bargaining has contributed t o significant gains in overall bargaining outcomes for fire fighters indicates that significant wage increases for fire fighters have not dampened their success in achieving non-wage gains as well. There is some support, however, for the belief that unions gradually shift their relative priorities between wages and fringe benefits as they become more established. For example, in his study of transit motormen, Lurie concluded that after 1938 transit unions placed a higher priority on securing fringe benefits than they had in the preceding two decades.' '
Employment. An enduring controversy in economics involves the disemployment effects of uni0nisrn.l The controversy involves the extent t o which bargained increases in wages and other terms of employment will result in reduced levels of employment. This controversy is particularly meaningful t o the current predicament of municipal governments. Given the "essential" nature of many municipal services, it seems highly unlikely that increases in the price of labor could be offset by reductions in employment. This does appear t o be the case for uniformed services, where the employment levels of police have remained constant and fire fighter employment levels have actually increased despite increases in the price of 1abor.l However, the inelasticity of demand for these occupational groups is not characteristic of all municipal services. Benecki found that COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR LOCAL SERVICES unionization significantly reduced overall employment levels, particularly in large cities.' O These reductions in employment, of course, might result from a variety of sources, among them decisions by the local legislature t o decrease the quantity of municipal services in the face of higher labor costs, substitution of new technologies for relatively more expensive labor, or increases in the productivity of existing employees.
Environmental Moderators. As we noted in our discussion of the taxonomy, environmental factors affect other variables within each component of the model. Environmental influences are particularly important in assessing the effects of unionization and collective bargaining on local government inputs. Two specific environmental influences, the city government structure and the degree of monopsony power held by the city, seem especially likely t o moderate the influences of unionization and collective bargaining on local government inputs.
Three types of city government structure have been studied in assessing the impacts of collective bargaining: city manager, commission, and mayor-council. It is generally believed that a manager or commission type government, because it is more professional, will be able t o hold the line against unions more effectively than a mayor-council form of government. However, manager and commission structures d o not appear t o moderate union influences o n wages and fringe benefitsS1 In fact, there is some indication that the wages of union members might actually be higher in the city manager cities, but these wage differentials are probably offset by higher employee p r o d u~t i v i t y .~ Another factor that may blunt the power of a union is the monopsony power held by the municipal employer. Monopsony refers t o the demand side of the demand-supply equation. It is analogous t o a monopoly, but, instead of one supplier, there is only one purchaser of a good or service. Thus, the degree t o which a city is the only buyer of particular labor skills in a given geographic area, it exercises monopsony power. With only one exception, research indicates that city monopsony power does dampen union i n f l~e n c e .~ However, Hall and Vanderporten suggest that monopsony power might moderate union influence only under limited c i r c~m s t a n c e s .~ Hall and Vanderporten found that the ability of geographically isolated cities t o wield monopsony power is not sustained when employees have achieved formal bargaining rights. In such cases, bilateral monopoly settlements yielded salaries similar t o those reached in cities located in more competitive urban areas. Thus, a strong union might be able t o overcome the monopsonistic power of a city.
Other research, while not testing the monopsony issue directly, has looked into differentials in union power associated with city or metropolitan area size. Both Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg found that the union had greater impact upon wages in smaller cities than in larger cities.' Gerhart, in assessing aggregate contract outcomes, discovered that unions operating in small SMSAs fared better than unions in jurisdictions outside of SMSAs or than unions in large SMSAS.'~ Surprisingly, contract index scores were lowers in large SMSAs. Among his explanations for the relative success of governmental jurisdictions in large SMSAs was that management might be more sophisticated and that the process may be more political, and hence informal, in the largest cities. Both of these would have a tendency t o decrease union power relative t o management. Thus, it appears that employer monopsony can have a dampening effect on union power, but only in limited circumstances.
Activities
While a great deal of heat has been generated in the last several years about collective bargaining and employee productivity, work rules, and policy encroachment, the research t o date has shed little light upon these controversies.' ' Although his research was intended t o be exploratory rather than conclusive, Stanley's multiple-case study remains the most comprehensive analysis of collective bargaining and municipal a c t i v i t i e~.~ His general conclusion was that unions had won victories over working conditions in a narrow sense, but that management maintained firm control over policy determination and operations management.
In the decade since Stanley's research, n o one has undertaken t o reassess systematically his conclusions. However, two recent studies have looked a t various aspects of collective bargaining and work management. Coulter examined the influence of unions on the productivity of fire departments (as measured by the total cost of fires, i.e., expenditures plus property loss, per ~a p i t a ) .~ Using a multivariate procedure called discriminant analysis, Coulter concluded that unionism neither decreased nor increased productivity.
Clues t o the reasons why unionization or collective bargaining might have n o net effect on productivity are provided in a recent study of public mass transit organi~ations.~ Collectively-bargained work rules, generally believed t o reduce productivity, were found t o have both positive and negative effects on labor productivity and operating costs. This finding confirms Stanley's earlier assertion that "some forces tend t o offset each ~t h e r . "~ Overall, however, the transit study ' concluded that productivity and efficiency could be improved if labor would agree t o the relaxation of certain scheduling and guaranteed-minimum work rules, and if both labor and management cooperated in developing work attendance incentives and improving grievance procedures.
Outputs
Although the research is far from voluminous, we know much more about the impact of collective bargaining on municipal outputs than about its impacts on municipal activities. For instance, widespread consensus surrounds the conclusion that collective bargaining has driven municipal expenditures upward.j In the most comprehensive study of the influences of collective bargaining on expenditure patterns, Benecki found that unionization was associated with higher personnel expenditures and higher overall expenditures. These results, however, were not uniform for large and small cities. In the largest cities, unionization was associated with lower levels of governmental activity because of a highly significant and negative relationship between unionization and employment. On the other hand, unionization in the smallest cities was associated with higher levels of governmental activity related t o significantly higher personnel expenditures.
A possible reason for this disparity between large and small cities is that larger cities tend t o offer a greater quantity and variety of services while smaller cities might offer an irreducible core. The greater quantity and variety offers a source of slack t o the larger cities. Benecki speculates that large cities can eliminate peripheral programs and still maintain their core while smaller cities ~a n n o t .~ Thus, large cities are more likely t o cut back on output and incur disemployment. Smaller cities are more likely t o incur higher levels of expenditures, especially in the personnel sector, and t o implement some revenue stopgap, e.g., incurring short-term debt, in order t o cope with the aftermaths of unionization and collective bargaining.
The differences between large and small cities might also be accounted for by differences in the development of unionization in the two size classification^.^ Larger cities exhibit greater unionization, which might reflect longer-standing bargaining relationships. If this is true, then the adjustment mechanism used by smaller cities, that of expenditure adjustment, may represent the short-run impact of bargaining. In the long run, however, employment might be expected t o decline in smaller cities just as it has in large cities.
In the fact of expenditure increases, revenues and taxes have risen correspondingly. Schmenner found tax rates positively correlated with police-fire wage settlem e n t~.However, when the tax rate was lagged back s two years, it was negatively correlated with police-fire wages. Perhaps the most plausible explanation for these temporal differences is that, in the short run, politicians seldom react t o negotiated wage increases by increasing taxes. However, local decision makers must ultimately raise taxes as a result of negotiated wage increases. In a similar vein, Baderschneider found that fiscal effort was greater in jurisdictions that were covered by collective bargaining legislation for police and fire fighter^.^
Consequences
Like the activities category of the taxonomy, very little research has been directed at discovering how and in what ways unionization and collective bargaining might affect local service effectiveness. Two studies, focusing on fire departments and public transit agencies, have explored simple associations between collective bargaining variables and measures of service effectiveness. Coulter examined the relationship between union-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW ism and fire suppression effectiveness (dollars of property loss per 1000 p o p~l a t i o n ) .~ Perry, et al., looked at " the associations of a variety of legal, organizational, and policy variables with two measures of transit service effectiveness (revenue passengers per service-area-population and revenue-passengers per revenue vehicle hour).3 Neither study found any significant relationships between the effectiveness measures and the independent variables.
. . . productivity and efficiency could be improved if labor would agree to the relaxation of certain scheduling and guaran teed-minimum work rules, and if both labor and management cooperated in developing work attendance incentives and improving grievance procedures.
These results are obviously not sufficient t o warrant sweeping conclusions about collective bargaining and the consequences of local services, but they clearly call into question the presumption that bargaining influences significantly the consequences of local s e r~i c e s .~ What might explain the lack of association? One explanation might simply be that the only two services that have been analyzed thus far-fire and transit functions-are not representative of the relationships that exist for most local government functions; analysis of other, non-uniformed services might possibly produce different results. Another explanation is purely methodological. Considering the probably large number of determinants of the effectiveness of any local government service, the influences of collective bargaining might well be indetectable, especially given the crudeness of most measure- Little of a general nature is known, except that collective bargaining continues to stimulate both positive and negative influences on productivity and work management.
OUTPUTS:
Collective bargaining has driven municipal expenditures and fiscal effort upward. CONSEQUENCES: Limited evidence indicates that collective bargaining has had no impact on the effectiveness of local senices. ment methods. Of course, the absence of an association between bargaining and consequences could also indicate that the consequences dimension of the taxonomy is much more complex than the variables that have been studied. For example, if collective bargaining has contributed t o redistributions of local government outputs, then any attempt t o measure collective bargaining's impacts should probably focus on citywide rather than service-related measures of effectiveness.
Conclusions
This paper has reviewed empirical research on the impacts of unionization and collective bargaining on local government services. Our conclusions about these impacts are summarized in Table 2 . In retrospect, this collection of research findings represents significant strides beyond our knowledge of a few years ago. However, important questions about impacts within each category in the taxonomy remain t o be investigated and answered.
The various studies have shown that unions probably d o contribute positively t o employee wages. The precise magnitude of this influence is difficult t o judge. While more work needs t o be done in determining the effect, greater emphasis should be given t o non-uniformed employees. More specifically, studies which look at several categories of employees should be conducted. Furthermore, total compensation should be included more frequently in this research. Unionization and collective bargaining probably influence total compensation, but the magnitude is difficult t o judge given our existing knowledge.
There is also a need t o determine if collective bargaining encourages management t o substitute capital for labor and, if so, how much. Furthermore, changes in the occupational composition of the public workforce also need t o be assessed. This type of research might shed light on the role unions have played in local government innovation. Better methods for measuring least-cost combinations of capital and labor might first have t o be developed.
As public employee unions expand and mature, bargaining emphasis appears t o change. Hours, fringe benefits, and work rules may take on greater importance. If this is so, productivity bargaining may become a dominant form of bargaining in the future. It will be crucial t o better understand this type of bargaining in order t o avoid the pitfalls that Horton uncovered in New York City.4 O Methodologies must also be developed for assessing the productivity-related implications of changes in work rules.
It is with regard t o local government outputs and consequences that the most glaring research needs arise. Is it city size along that is associated with the differential union effect on expenditures or some other variables? Virtually n o research has explored unionization's effects on consequences. Only through a more complete understanding of these and other impacts will we be able t o sweep away the myths surrounding local government bargaining and replace them with more informed judgments.
Notes

